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moral problem of government has always been to
strike a just and effective balance between freedom
and authority. When freedom degenerates into anarchy,
the human personality becomes subject to arbitrary,
brutal, and capricious forces -- witness aberrations
of terrorism in even the most humane societies.
(Bauman, 1982)Yet when the demand for order overrides
all other considerations, man becomes a means
and not an end, a tool of impersonal machinery.
Human rights are the very essence of a meaningful
life, and human dignity is the ultimate purpose
of civil governments. Respect for the rights of
man is written into the founding documents of
almost every nation of the world. It has long
been part of the common speech and daily lives
of our citizens. The obscene and atrocious acts
systematically employed to devalue, debase, and
destroy man during World War II vividly and ineradicably
impressed on the world the enormity of the challenge
to human rights. It was to end such abuses and
to provide moral authority in international affairs
that new institutions and legal standards were
forged after that war -- globally in the United
Nations and in this hemisphere in a strengthened
inter-American system. (Chomsky & Herman,
1979) The fact remains that continuing practices
of intimidation, terror, and brutality, fostered
sometimes from outside national territories and
sometimes from inside, mark the distance yet to
be traveled before the community of nations can
claim that it is truly civilized. This is why
the distinguished junior senator from New York,
Senator Moynihan, is surely right in stressing
that human rights should be not simply a humanitarian
program but a political component of American
foreign policy.
For the difference between freedom and totalitarianism
is not transient or incidental; it is a moral
conflict, of fundamental historical proportions,
which gives the modem age its special meaning
and peril. Our defense of human rights reminds
us of the fundamental reason that our competition
with totalitarian systems is vital to the cause
of mankind. There is no reason for us to accept
the hypocritical double standard increasingly
prevalent in the United Nations where petty tyrannies
berate us for our alleged moral shortcomings.
On this issue we are not -- and have no reason
to be -- on the defensive. And yet, while human
rights must be an essential component of our foreign
policy, to pursue it effectively over the long
term we must take the measure of the dangers and
dilemmas along the way. First, any foreign policy
must ultimately be judged by its operational results.
To be sure, the advocacy of human rights has in
itself a political and even strategic significance.
But, in the final reckoning, more than advocacy
will be counted. If we universalize our human
rights policy, applying it indiscriminatingly
and literally to all countries, we run the risk
of becoming the world's policeman-an objective
the American people may not support. At a minimum
we will have to answer what may be the question
for several friendly governments: how and to what
extent we will support them if they get into difficulties
by following our maxims. And we will have to indicate
what sanctions we will apply to less well-disposed
governments which challenge the very precepts
of our policy. (Dobriansky, 1989)
If, on the other hand, we confine ourselves to
proclaiming objectives that are not translated
into concrete actions and specific results, we
run the risk of demonstrating that we are impotent
and of evoking a sense of betrayal among those
our human rights policy seeks to help.
Such a course could tempt unfriendly governments
to crack down all the harder on their dissidents,
in order to demonstrate the futility of our proclamations-this
indeed has already happened to some extent in
the Soviet Union. Nor can we escape from the dilemma
by asserting that there is no connection between
human rights behavior and our attitude on other
foreign policy problems-by "unlinking,"
as the technical phrase goes, human rights from
other issues. For this implies that there is no
cost or consequence to the violation of human
rights, turning our proclamation of human rights
into a liturgical theme -- decoupled, unenforced,
and compromised. Or else we will insist on our
values only against weaker countries, in Latin
America or Asia, many of which may even be conducting
foreign policies supportive of our own. This would
lead to the paradox that the weaker the nation
and the less its importance on the international
scene, the firmer and more uncompromising would
be our human rights posture. (Forsythe, 1990)
Second, precisely because human rights advocacy
is a powerful political weapon, we must be careful
that in its application we do not erode all moral
dividing lines. We must understand the difference
between governments making universal ideological
claims and countries which do not observe all
democratic practices-either because of domestic
turmoil, foreign danger, or national traditions
-- but which makes no claim to historical permanence
or universal relevance. In the contemporary world
it is the totalitarian systems which have managed
the most systematic and massive repression of
human rights. (Shoultz, 1980)
In recent decades no totalitarian regime has
ever evolved into a democracy. Several authoritarian
regimes-such as Spain, Greece, and Portugal --
have done so. We must therefore maintain the moral
distinction between aggressive totalitarianism
and other governments which with all their imperfections
are trying to resist foreign pressures or subversion
and which thereby help preserve the balance of
power in behalf of all free peoples.
Our human rights policy owes special consideration
to the particular international and domestic setting
of governments important to our security and supportive
of free world security interests. There are, of
course, some transgressions of human rights which
no necessity -- real or imagined-can justify.
But there are also realities in the threats nations
face, either from terrorism at home such as in
Argentina or aggression across borders such as
Iran or Korea. And we must keep in mind that the
alternative to some governments that resist totalitarianism
with authoritarian methods may not be greater
democracy and an enhancement of human rights but
the advent of even more repression, more brutality,
more suffering. The ultimate irony would be a
posture of resignation toward totalitarian states
and harassment of those who would be our friends
and who have every prospect of evolving in a more
humane direction. We must take care, finally,
that our affirmation of human rights is not manipulated
by our political adversaries to isolate countries
whose security is important for the future of
freedom, even if their domestic practices fall
short of our maxims. (Stohl & Carleton, 1985)
The membership of the UN Human Rights Commission,
composed as it is of a number of nations with
extremely dubious human rights practices, does
not augur well for an objective approach to this
issue in the United Nations. Cuba and other Communist
governments, as well as the more repressive regimes
of the less developed world, have no moral standing
to bring other nations to international account.
We should not hesitate to say so. Third, there
is the ominous prospect that the issue of human
rights if not handled with great wisdom could
unleash new forces of American isolationism. This
could defeat the administration's goal of using
it to mobilize support for continued American
involvement in world affairs. That the human rights
issue could develop a life of its own, regardless
of the administration's prudent sense of its aims
and limits is already evident from some developments
in Congress. (Stohl, 1984)
A distorted or misunderstood human rights policy
can become the basis and justification of a modern
isolationism. What appeals to many as a useful
impetus to resistance to the Communist challenge
can be used by others to erase all the distinctions
between totalitarians and those that resist them,
to induce indifference to European Communist parties'
accession to power, or to disrupt security relationships
which are essential to maintaining the geopolitical
balance. Excuses can be found to deny help to
almost any friendly country at the precise moment
when it faces its most serious external challenge.
If conservatives succeed in unraveling ties with
nations on the Left and liberals block relations
with nations on the Right, we could find ourselves
with no constructive foreign relations at all,
except with a handful of industrial democracies.
The end result ironically could be the irrelevance
of the United States to other nations of the world.
A policy of moral advocacy that led to American
abdication would surely condemn countless millions
to greater suffering, danger, or despair. Fourth
and most fundamentally, we should never forget
that the key to successful foreign policy is a
sense of proportion. Some of the most serious
errors of our foreign policy, both of over commitment
and withdrawal, have occurred when we lost the
sense of balance between our interests and our
ideals. It was under the banners of moralistic
slogans a decade and a half ago that we launched
adventures that divided our country and undermined
our international position. . (Chomsky & Herman,
1979) A few years later young people were parading
in front of the White House carrying coffins and
candles and accusing their government of loving
war; the national leadership was denounced as
excessively, indeed imperialistically, involved
in the internal affairs of other nations. A few
years later still, the government was attacked
for sacrificing our ethical values on the altar
of detente and being insufficiently concerned
with the domestic behavior of other nations. Neither
we nor the rest of the world can any longer afford
such extreme fluctuations. (Bauman, 1982)
Human rights policy in this period of American
responsibility must strengthen the steady purpose
and responsible involvement of the American people.
It can do so only if it is presented in the context
of a realistic assessment of world affairs and
not as the magic cure for the difficulties and
shortcomings of mankind's contemporary experience.
The administration is surely right in insisting
that human rights is a legitimate and recognized
subject of international discourse; it is an object
of international legal standards -- importantly
as a result of American initiatives by administrations
of both parties. At the same time, we must recognize
that we serve the cause of freedom also by strengthening
international security and maintaining ties with
other countries defending their independence against
external aggression and struggling to overcome
poverty, even if their internal structures differ
from ours. We cannot afford to subordinate either
concern to the other. Morality without security
is ineffectual; security without morality is empty.
To establish the relationship and proportion between
these goals is perhaps the most profound challenge
before our government and our nation.
American Foreign Policy and China
How to deal with the rising power of China has
become a question central to U.S. foreign policy.
A strong China could become a powerful adversary
to the United States and the current world order;
a collapsing China with roughly one-fourth of
humankind would cast a shadow on the future of
the world. Luckily, the United States can influence
the outcome: What China will become and do depend
largely on how the existing major powers, primarily
the United States, treat it. Thus, no other foreign
policy issues deserve a higher priority than does
developing a peaceful, stable, and cooperative
relationship with China. (Barnett, 1996)
Washington's official China policy could be termed
"constructive engagement," but some
analysts, unsatisfied with this approach, have
called for a new Cold War-style containment of
Beijing; others have proposed a "conditional
engagement" policy. From the harsh hawks
on the far right to some of the most respected,
moderate scholars, these analysts have all assumed
that China already sees or soon will see the United
States as its target or rival, and that Beijing
clearly seeks dominance or hegemony, at least
in Asia.(Bernstein & Munro, 1997) Unless and
until China adopts a Western political system
and values--something these worried observers
doubt will happen anytime soon--the analysts contend
that the United States must treat China's empowerment
as a threat. In short, Western observers have
tended to view China almost unanimously either
as a new, Soviet-style source of Communist revolution
or as a Wilhelmine Germany bound to expand beyond
its borders when it becomes strong enough. Yet
this debate has thus far lacked a thorough discussion
of China's strategic concerns and intentions.(Christensen,
1996) Many analysts automatically assume that
the huge difference between U.S. and Chinese political
systems and values, and China's rapidly increasing
capabilities, will necessarily infuse Chinese
power with an aggressive and challenging character.
Before the United States decides either to restrict
and reduce Chinese power or to employ various
engagement strategies to try to change it--either
of which could be very expensive--it should ascertain
the strategic intentions and the likely international
demands of the Chinese leadership. Washington
needs to rethink its China policy. China does
not necessarily threaten the United States, because
the political interests of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) regime--and thus "official"
Chinese national interests--differ markedly from
the nationalistic claims common to most rising
powers. A window of opportunity has appeared for
the United States to accommodate and incorporate
China into the international system, effectively
and inexpensively, through a modus vivendi with
the current political regime in Beijing. By employing
wise and proactive policies, the United States
can dampen and even eliminate the firewood before
nationalistic flames envelop China. Ironically,
in the campaign to transform China into a secure,
satisfied, and thus peaceful major power in the
twenty-first century, the world should view the
CCP regime in Beijing as an ally, not as a target.
American Foreign Policy and Cuba
The bitter rivalry between the United States and
Cuba has occupied a position as one of the principal
political disputes in the Western Hemisphere for
the past 35 years. Since the rise of Fidel Castro,
the governments of these two countries have placed
themselves on opposite sides of almost every major
regional and global issue. They have long held
vastly different ideas about what constitutes
a good and just government, what kind of international
behavior is legitimate, and the ends that foreign
policy should serve. Moreover, they have not only
harbored political differences but also maintained
a very intense dislike of one another. The United
States has attempted to sustain a picture of Cuba
as an international outlaw, the source of much
turmoil, crisis, and mischief in the world. Adding
a personal dimension to the attacks, the United
States has also sought to demonize Castro, creating
and continually portraying an image of him as
the embodiment of evil. Although personal assaults
do not often figure largely in Cuban diatribes
due to the presidential turnover in the United
States, Cuba continues to depict its closest neighbor
as an imperialist giant, abusing its power and
contributing to, if not responsible for, injustice,
inequality, and misery throughout the world. In
sum, the relationship has been one of mutual hostility
and distrust, fueled by a combination of differences
in ideology, interests, culture, and power and
exacerbated by geographic proximity and contact.
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